The Failure of Lehman Brothers: Causes, Preventive Measures and Recommendations by Mawutor, John Kwaku Mensah
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.4, 2014 
 
85 
The Failure of Lehman Brothers: Causes, Preventive Measures 
and Recommendations 
 
John Kwaku Mensah Mawutor 
School of Graduate Studies, Accounting Department 
University of Professional Studies, Accra/ P.O.Box 149 Legon, Accra Ghana 
Email: kwaku2mensah @gmail.com/ kwaku2mensah@yahoo.co.uk 
 
Abstract 
The 2008 global financial meltdown witnessed most of the top global financial institutions crumble into 
liquidation and bankruptcy. The incident culminated in most of these firms either liquidated or experienced 
plummetion in returns. The failure of Lehman Brothers in the midst of the global financial crisis was the largest 
catastrophe to hit the financial industry in the United States. Notably, the leading US investment bank suffered 
huge losses within the month of September. Lehman’s stock price plummeted by 73% of its value in the first half 
of September alone and by the mid of September 2008, lost $3.9 billion in their attempt to dispose of a majority 
of their shares in one of their subsidiaries.  To contribute to the body of knowledge, this paper investigated and 
reviewed the activities or transactions that resulted in the failure of Lehman Brothers. The findings revealed 
multiplicity of factors ranging from dubious accounting practices, unethical management practices, over 
investment in risky unsecured investments, laxity on the part of regulators. External auditors also played a major 
part in this failure by not detecting these financial statement malpractices by the Lehman managers. Policy 
makers such as the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), Security and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), the Basel Accord etc, ought to initiate stringent policies to address Lehman failure to avert any future 
occurrence. 
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1. Introductions 
The 2008 global financial meltdown saw most of the top global financial institutions crumble into liquidation 
and bankruptcy (Murphy, 2008; Mensah, 2012). Those which were not liquidated either experienced plummetion 
in returns and their respective operations or filed for voluntary bankruptcy (ISSER, 2008). The bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers in the midst of the global financial crisis was the largest catastrophe to hit the financial 
industry in the United States (Morin & Muax, 2011). Lehman Brothers was the leading US investment  bank 
worth $600 billion (D’Arcy, 2009). Apart from the famous Enron failure in the early 2000, the failure of Lehman 
Brothers was described as the largest unit financial institution to have collapsed with assets worth $600  billion 
in 2008 (Jeffers, 2011). Particularly, the leading US investment bank suffered huge losses within the month of 
September. Lehman’s stock price plummeted by 73% of its value in the first half of September alone and by the 
mid of September 2008, lost $3.9 billion in their attempt to dispose of a majority of their shares in one of their 
subsidiaries (West, 2009). Prior to their liquidation, the global crisis prompted Lehman to close its leading 
subprime lender (BNC  Mortgages) in 23 locations (Wilchins and DaSilva, 2010). The losses were so successive 
such that by September 15th 2008, Lehman Brothers filed for voluntary bankruptcy at the  US  Bankruptcy Court,  
Southern  District  of  New  York  (Murphy,  2008). The  voluntary bankruptcy was necessitated by the 
unsuccessful attempt for a possible government bail-out and mergers coupled with a number of acquisition 
attempt by companies such as Barclays bank and many others.  
To account for the possible causes of the Lehman’s failure, various financial analysts have advanced series of 
academic and practical arguments aimed at unearthing the exact causes of the  melt-down.  Others have also  
conducted  series  of  research  purposely to  account  for  Lehman’s failure (Manum & Johnson, 2012). 
This study aims at investigating and reviewing the activities or transactions that resulted in the failure of Lehman 
Brothers. The paper will review the background of Lehman Brothers; the rippling impact on the company, the 
US economy and the world as a whole; the causes of the failure and the necessary recommendation to curb any 
future occurrence in the financial market.  
1.1 Profile of Lehman Brothers 
The formation of Lehman Brothers dates back to 1844 when Henry Lehman and his two brothers (Emmanuel 
and Mayer, n.d.) established a small shop in Alabama (US) to sell groceries, local cotton farmers,  utensils and 
other commodities. As the cotton industry grew, Lehman Brothers  envisaged  the  need  to  enhance  their  
liquidity;  apparently, they  joined  the  Cotton exchange and later the New York exchange market  where they 
underwrote some of the bigger public offering in the early 1900’s (D’Arcy, 2000). The company was run as a 
family business for so many decades until they formed a partnership with retail giants; Goldman and Sachs in the 
early1900’s (Wilks, 2008). The main purpose of the partnership was to build a strong team to fund the emerging 
retail business in the early days of 1900 (D’Arcy, 2009). The alliance saw the  fortunes  of  the  company  
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growing  very  fast  to  the  extent that Lehman Brothers were designated by the Alabama  government  to sell 
the State’s bond. Their fortunes were further enhanced when the US decided to transform the economy from 
agrarian to an industrialized economy by developing their railway system. This offered new opportunities for  
Lehman Brothers to enter the financial market and subsequently raised funds for firms engaged in the railway 
industry. Chicago railways, North Western railways, the Pennsylvania Railroads, the Baltimore and Ohio 
railways were some of the firms that Lehman raised funds for (Johnson et. al., 2012). In pursuance of their 
aggressive need for the underwriting industry, the firm further established a special unit aimed at underwriting 
businesses in the 1900’s (Lartey, 2012). 
According to D’Arcy (2009), the company continued their operations in the financial market until 1975 when 
they merged with Kuhn, Loeb and Company to become the 4th largest investment bank in the US however, the 
merger  did not meet its aspiration, culminating into a takeover by American Express which later merged with 
Shearson to form Shearson Lehman Brothers in 1984. The new firm diversified its operations into banking and 
brokerage by acquiring a number of subsidiaries such as Neuberger Bremen, Lincolm capital in the early 1990s. 
The firm finally had their brand name reverted to Lehman Brothers in 1993. In view of the new line of business 
and arrangement, Lehman Brothers experienced a steady growth apparently increasing their revenue base and 
saw their workforce increase  from  8,500  to approximately 28,000 in 1994 (Kimberly, 2011; D’Arcy, 2009; 
New Financial Times. 2008). A year  after  celebrating  the  150th  anniversary  in  the  year  2000,  Lehman  
Brothers suffered a huge loss as a result of the terrorist attack on the company’s office in the World Trade Centre 
in September 2001. After this unfortunate calamity, Lehman Brothers moved into their new head-office in 
midtown Manhattan in 2002 (Valukas, 2010). Lehman Brothers ended their 158 years existence in September 
2008 when they filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy petitions in the federal Court which saw the company’s assets 
disposed to several firms. 
 
2. Causes of Lehman’s failure 
Following the fall of Lehman Brothers, a number of reasons have been attributed to  the failure after thorough 
investigations were conducted by financial and non-financial analysts (Kimberly, 2011). None of these analysts 
gave a single cause to this failure (Azadinmin, 2012); however,; a number of factors were discovered for their 
failure. The factors that accounted for this failure were poor management choices coupled with unethical actions; 
repeal of the Glass- Steagall Act of 1933; liquidity crisis; financial leverage; excessive losses; Repos 105, 
massive credit default swaps, subprime mortgage crisis, complex capital structure, unsuccessful bail-out and 
take-overs (Kimberly, 2011; Morin & Maux, 2011; D’Arcy, 2009). 
2.1 Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act 
The advocates of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 blamed the entire US financial crisis on the  enactment  of  the  
Gramm-Leach-Biley  Act  of  1999  to  replace  the  Glass-Steagall  Act (LaRoche, n.d). To reduce and eradicate 
possible conflict of interest, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 was enacted to separate commercial banking from 
investment banking after the great depression years of 1930-1993 (Tabarrok, n.d). During the great depression, 
9,000 banks were reported to have failed (Lartey, 2012). This Act was amended and replaced in 1999 to allow 
commercial banks carry investment banking activities. The replacement of the Glass-Steagal Act of 1933 saw 
many commercial banks merging with investment banks. Financial analysts blamed this change on the failure of 
Lehman. In their quest to compete with commercial banks which has high leverage positions, Lehman merged 
and acquired many commercial and investment banks (Valukas, 2008). The unethical merging activities by 
Lehman exposed them to several risks leading to their bankruptcy (Boot, 2008). 
 2.3 Unethical Management practices 
In their quest to achieve their expansion strategy and other specific objectives, managers of Lehman decided to 
use a number of dubious mechanisms, unacceptable accounting practice coupled with their blatant disregard for 
prudent corporate governance practices (Caplan et al, 2012). According to Gasaparino (2008), Lehman 
employed ―window dressing presentation facilitating the manipulation of their financial statement aimed at 
attracting investments and showing a different picture of the firm. This was corroborated by the application of 
charges against their auditors ―Ernst &Youngǁ by the Attorney General for assisting Lehman Brothers in 
perpetrating a number of financial statement fraud (Valukas, 2010). Lehman further used Repos 105 transactions 
to enhance the firm’s financial health at the year end. Lehman’s managers blatantly violated the Sarbenes-Oxely 
Act which was enacted after the collapse of Enron and WorldCom in 2002 as a result, numerous accounting 
scandals were discovered (Kourabi et al, 2011).  The Sarbenes Oxely Act was enacted to strengthen external 
auditing practices and independence, provide timely disclosure, restore customers’ confidence, enhance internal 
control practice and strengthen the roles and actions of directors, enhance sound securities practices (Valukas, 
2010). Lehman violated most of these provisions when they used Repos 105 to misled financial statements 
(Jeffers, 2011). This action was further corroborated by the subpoena of Lehman’s CFO and CEO and other 
executives for a possible financial penalties and imprisonment by the US House of Representatives’ Committee 
on Oversight and Government Reforms (Valukas, 2012). In October  2008, most of Lehman’s executives 
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including Richard Fuld,  the  CEO were subpoenaed  for  questioning  as  a  result  of  purported securities fraud 
practices. 
Lehman was also caught in the web of Executives’ conflict of interest culminating into the payment of excessive 
bonuses to Directors prior to the failure of firm (Murphy, 2008). Within eight  years, Fuld was said to have paid 
himself $300 million dollars in pay and bonuses making him one of the highly paid CEO’s in the US (NYT, 
2008). Despite the challenges faced prior  to  bankruptcy,  Lehman’s  executives  were  reported  to  have  
increased  their  bonuses significantly to $480 million (CNBC, 2008). Many financial experts blamed Lehman’s 
failure on the unethical actions of most executives. The involvement of senior management executives of 
Lehman Brothers’  in the  bankruptcy  was  further  confirmed by the  breach  of  its  own  risk  thresholds  on  its 
commercial real estate investments (Kimberly, 2011; Valukas, 2010). In July 2007 for instance, the bank’s senior 
managers were reported to have violated thirty (30) real estate specific transactions risks established by the firm 
(Kimberly, 2011). Specific evidence also shows that five days before filing the bank’s bankruptcy, Lehman’s 
liquidity pool indicated $41 billion; apparently, this figure was massaged with deposits of clearing houses. This 
action was a clear violation of regulatory guidelines. In testifying to the Committee on Financial Services, 
Valukas reported that the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) were aware of these breaches but simply 
ignored them. Timely rectification of these breaches would have prevented the massive loss reported in the real 
estate market (Murphy, 2008). 
In addition to the clear demonstration of unethical behaviour by management regarding specific transactions, 
Lehman employed repurchase agreement (Repos 105) to manipulate the financial statement of the company 
(Morin & Maux, 2011). According to Kimberly (2011), the Lehman balance sheet in June 2008 was fabricated 
with window-dressing technique popularly referred to as Repos 105. This action led to the removal of $50 billion 
in commitment from their financial statement (Morin & Maux, 2011). Notwithstanding the unethical 
employment of Repos 105 by Lehman, it is legal for banks to engage in Repos 105 transactions (Wilchins & 
DaSilva, 2010). Essentially, repurchase agreement has been historically used by banks to manage their short-
term cash liquidity (Mensah, 2012). This involves the pledging of government bonds or some short- term  low-
risk  instruments  in  return  for  short-term  funds  (Casu  et  al,  2006).  Traditional repurchase agreement 
(Repos) involves the agreement between two or more financial institutions where one of  these  institutions 
decides to dispose of its short-term security for cash with the condition that after a period of time, the seller will 
buy it back at a predetermined date and rates (Agyemang, 2012; Mensah, 2012). The purported security disposed 
by the seller only serves as collateral (Jeffers, 2011). These short-term securities will then revert back to the 
seller after paying the cash received in addition to the interest thereon (usually 2 percent). In case the seller 
defaults  in  payment  on  the  due  date,  the  buyer  may dispose  of  the  pledged  securities  for reimbursement 
(Casu et al, 2006).  In a nutshell, Repos 105 is simply a measure employed by firms to raise short-term funds at a 
wholesale rate by pledging their long-term financial assets to improve their liquidity position. To account for 
Repos 105, the bank pledging its securities for cash reports it as a loan with collateral (Jeffers, 2011). To 
support/back-up their unethical practices, Lehman instead failed to use  the  right  accounting  system  to  report  
Repos  105  thereby  failing  to  disclose  it  to  the government,, credit agencies investors and its own  board of 
directors (Morin & Maux, 2011). According to Wilchins  and  DaSilva (2010),  Lehman perpetuated  this  
practice by acquiring government bond from another bank using one of its special units in the United  States. 
Just before the predetermined dates for settlement or the end of the quarter, Lehman’s special unit then transfers 
these bonds to their affiliates in London (Lehman Brothers International). Their London affiliate then transfers 
the bonds to another bank for cash with  a pledge to buy it back at a higher rate (usually 105 percent of the price). 
The cash received is then transferred to the Lehman  Brothers  US  to  pay  off a large amount  of  liabilities  
thereby  reducing  the  firm’s liabilities  to  show  healthier  quarterly  reports  and  enhance  corresponding  
ratios,  investors’ confidence, regulators and the general public. Prior to the subsequent quarter, Lehman Brothers 
will then borrow more at other lending institutions to buy back the securities from their London affiliates at 
105% of  the initial price. The financial statement will then revert back to its initial unhealthy position after such 
practices making Lehman worse-off just because they want their financial  position  to  look  sound  and  healthy  
in  the  eyes  of  investors,  regulators  and  the government. This practices amount to financial statement fraud 
(COSO, 2005) and one of the factors that led to the collapse of Lehman (Valukas, 2010). By extension, the 
external auditors of Lehman cannot be exonerated from this heinous crime (Carcello and Hermanson, 2008). 
2.4 Liquidity crisis 
Central  to  the failure  of  Lehman was  their inability to  meet  short  term  obligation (Valukas, 2011).  Despite 
its high asset base, Lehman was experiencing intermittent liquidity problems.  As  a  result,  Lehman  was  losing  
its  market  confidence;  apparently,  most  banks withdrew their services and credit lines to Lehman Brothers 
(D’Arcy, 2009). At this point, the confidence level of lenders and customers weaned; rendering Lehman 
unattractive in the eyes of investors and prospective investors (Mensah, 2012). To address this challenge, 
Lehman reduced their gross asset base $147 billion to boost their liquidity position$45 billion (Valukas, 2011). 
Their  liquidity redemption strategy further saw the reduction in their commercial mortgage exposure by 20% 
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and leverage from a factor of 32 to approximately 25 (Lartey, 2012). Unlike their  rivals  ―Bear  Beach  Stearnsǁ  
which  suffered  the  same  fate  in  March  2008,  Lehman’s liquidity crisis was not rescued by their proposed 
strategy and bailout. Bear Beach Stearns was rescued by JPMorgan Chase to erode their liquidity crisis (D’Arcy, 
2009). 
2.5 Collateralized Debt obligation and Derivative crisis 
In their quest to increase to take advantage of opportunities in the real estate market, Lehman  Brothers  prior  to  
collapse  were  reported  to  have  ventured  into  several  risky  and unnecessary investments (Murphy,  2008). 
According to Kimberly (2011), Residential Whole Loans (RWL’s) was also reported to have accounted to the 
failure of Lehman Brothers. RWL’s are residential mortgages that is usually traded and pooled during the process 
of securitization and consequently metamorphose into Residential-Mortgaged Backed Securities (RMBS) 
(Lartey, 2012). As at May 2008, Lehman’s consolidated market value of RWL’s among its subsidiaries amounted 
to approximately $8.3 billion (Valukas, 2010). According to Murphy (2008), Lehman lacked a robust product 
control process to account for residential whole loans coupled with misstatement in assets further aggravating  
their position. To capitalize on speculative opportunities as well as reducing its exposure to credit risk in the 
financial market, Lehman entered the derivative market. This is aimed at managing the volatility of their assets 
and exposure. As at the time of filling their bankruptcy, Lehman had in its books an estimated notional derivative 
to the tune of $35 trillion in their portfolio (Kimberly, 2011) and held over 900,000 derivative positions globally 
(Valukas, 2010). These derivative instruments enable firms to derive the value of investment from the changes in 
the price and value of other underlying assets such as stocks or commodities (Buchanan, 2000). Most of these 
derivatives were credit default swaps; evidently, the property prices crashed in the financial market during the 
global economic crisis leading to repossession of assets, Lehman was reported to have written its credit default 
swaps (CDS) by $2.5 billion (D’Arcy, 2009). Credit derivatives such as loans, mortgages and other forms of 
loans are the main underlying assets CDS. Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) also accounted for the losses 
in the securities market during the global financial crisis of 2007 (Lang & Jagtiani, 2010). CDOs are derivative 
instruments which involves the conglomeration of both prime and subprime securities intended to be sold to a 
special purpose vehicle in a low-tax jurisdiction (Wilks, 2008). The buyer then repackages the loans and issues 
them as equity or bonds to other interested investor. Between the period 2006 and 2007 , half of Lehman’s CDOs 
estimated at $431 billion had experienced defaults by November 2008 (Valukas, 2010). Financial analyst argued 
that the decline in the values of CDOs significantly contributed to the collapse of Lehman Brothers. 
2.6 Leveraging 
The high borrowing attitude of Lehman to finance their assets culminated into high leverage position (Lartey, 
2012). A firm’s financial leverage is the firm’s capability to finance a portion of its assets with securities bearing 
fixed rate of interest with the hope of increasing the ultimate returns to the equity shareholders (Keown et al, 
2005). As at 2007, Lehman’s high leverage ratio has increased from 20 in 2004 to 44 to 1 shareholders’ equity 
(D’Arcy, 2008). By implication, for every $1 of cash and other available financial resources, Lehman would lend 
$44 which was too high a leverage ratio to maintain (Valukas, 2010). The consequence of the global financial 
crisis that saw prices sliding coupled with increased interest rates, Lehman’s financial position was adversely 
impacted leading to their bankruptcy (D’Arcy, 2009). 
2.7 Complex Capital Structure 
As a result of having to cope with conducting business in over 3,000 different legal entities, Lehman Brothers 
was confronted with issues regarding capital structure (Steinberg & Snowdon, 2009).  As  difficulties  arose/arise  
due  to  their  expansion  strategy  culminating  into  a significant growth. The growth was purported to have 
contributed to the high degree of capital structure complexity. A hand-full of financial analysts identified this 
phenomenon as a possible factor that contributed to the failure of Lehman. 
2.8 Unsuccessful bail-out and takeover attempts 
Recounting the events prior to their liquidation, Lehman Brothers tried a number of measures to redeem their 
operations. This was necessitated by the massive losses recorded in 2008 and their unsuccessful attempt to 
dispose of some of their subsidiaries. In their second financial quarter alone, the firm reported losses of $2.8 
billion which precipitated the disposal of $6 billion worth of their assets due to the low rated mortgage tranches 
in their subprime position (Anderson, 2008). By September 10, 2008, Lehman announced a loss of $3.9 billion 
in their attempt to sell-off their majority shares in most of their subsidiaries including Neuberger Bremen. 
Consequently, investors’ confidence continued to erode when their stock prices lost almost half of its value, as a 
result, S&P 500 dipped by 3.4%. This occurrence further saw the Dow Jones losing approximately 300 points the 
same time on investors’ perception about the security of the bank (Yandel, 2009). Their situation was worsened 
by the US government’s announcement plan not to assist any financial crisis that emerged at Lehman (Anderson, 
2009). In their pursuance to turn-around the fortunes of Lehman after the government’s announcement; Lehman 
Brothers reported a possible take-over deal with the Bank of America and Barclays bank (Caplan et al, 2012). 
These  take-over arrangements also failed to materialize when the UK financial service authority and the Bank of  
England was alleged to have vetoed the deal to rescue Lehman from collapse; consequently, the federal 
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regulators in the US also resisted a possible involvement of the Bank of America in their quest for a possible 
take-over (NYT, 2008). The last-minute break down in these re-organization attempts finally saw the liquidation 
of Lehman Brothers culminating into the application for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on September 15, 
2008 . 
 
3. Impact of Lehman’s failure 
The  collapse  of  Lehman  Brothers  revealed  adversity  in  the  operation  of  several organizations in  the US 
and the world as a whole. In the US alone, Lehman’s failure led to depreciation in price of  commercial  real 
estates, an extinguishing of 70% of $48 billion of receivables from derivatives, and the extinguishing of $46 
billion of its market value (Valukas, 2010; McCracken, 2008 & Investopedia, 2008). The hedge market was not 
spurred since over 1000 hedge funds used Lehman as the main broker and mostly relied on the firm for funding. 
Freddie Mac’s exposure to Lehman in relation to single-family home loans was estimated at $400 million 
(Murphy, 2008). Lehman’s demise also led to the writing-off of $48 million debts owed to the Federal 
Agricultural Corporation or Farmer Mac in  September (Bryce,  2008). Constellation Energy was also reported to 
have its stock going down by 56 percent on the New York Stock Exchange halting trading of Constellation 
Energy culminating into it buy-out by Mid American Energy (Maurna, 2008). The international community was 
not entirely exonerated from the adverse impact of Lehman’s failure. Japanese banks and insurers reported a 
potential loss of 249 billion yen ($2.4 billion) whereas a counsel  from the Royal Bank of Scotland Group is 
reported to be facing claims  between  $1.5  billion  and  $1.8  billion  with  respect  to  an  unsecured  guarantee  
from Lehman Brothers (Emily, 2008). In England, approximately 5,600 investors had invested in Lehman’s 
backed-structured product amounting to $160 million (Ross, 2009).  In  Germany, a state-owned bank lost about 
500,000 euros (Kirchfeld & Simmons, 2008) whilst hedge funds amounting to over $12 million were frozen in 
England as a result of Lehman’s bankruptcy (Spector, 2009).  The corroboration of these losses in the US and the 
international business community depicts the severity of Lehman’s failure on businesses. 
 
4. Preventive measures 
The severity of Lehman’s failure in global business has been described by financial analysts as ―second to 
noneǁ of an individual firm bankruptcy impacting on a large spectrum of businesses globally (Aversa,  2008). 
Some believe Lehman’s failure partially caused the 2007 economic meltdown (Murphy, 2008). An avalanche of 
preventive measures has been ascribed by various analysts who if adhered to, would have prevented  the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers. According to Kimberly (2011), the collapse would have being prevented supposing 
management had taken more proactive risk management actions than their reactive measures at a time  the 
company was almost down. The indicators were written all over but management couldn’t find the right solution 
to curtail the crisis (Valukas, 2010; Emily, 2009). Significantly, regulators and credit agencies cannot be 
exonerated from these failures. Company regulators were the right agencies to have cautioned and guided 
Lehman to engage and operate within the confines of business jurisdiction however, the regulators were reported 
on several occasions to have kept a blank eye on the of illegal and unethical activities of Lehman’s executives.  
In an attempt to predict the failure or sustainability of firms, Lehman’s failure has exposed the weaknesses in 
various models employed for this purpose. For instance, in analyzing the financial health of firms, areas of  
performance such as profitability, liquidity, solvency and efficiency indicators are considered (Mensah, 2012) 
however, much emphasis are not placed on the cash flows of those firms. A careful consideration of cash flow 
indicators could have prevented the liquidity problems of the firm. In view of the above measures, the 
inefficiencies inherent the auditing processes partly accounted for this failure. The assurance of a full disclosure 
by external auditors  in  relation  to  the   purported   financial  statement  fraud  perpetuated  by  Lehman’s 
management could have aided in avoiding this huge catastrophe (Kimberly, 2011). Notwithstanding the 
numerous preventive measure ascribed by analyst, a bail-out or take- over coupled  with good corporate 
governance practices, Lehman’s failure could have being predicted and prevented (D’Arcy, 2009). 
 
5. Recommendation 
The demise of Lehman clearly shows the linkage between regulations and actions management set-ups. The 
failures exposed the deficiency in the regulatory system thereby requiring urgent need for strict supervision of 
specific performance indicators such as a firm’s liquidity position, solvency and profitability.  Policy makers 
such as the International Financial Reporting Standards, SEC, the Basel Accord et al, must initiate stringent 
policies to address Lehman failure to avert any future occurrence. Firms must also be compelled to adhere to 
good corporate governance practice to restore investors’ confidence. Sound ethical practices and standards must 
adhere to and replicated in every organization. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The recent competition in the banking industry has led to most banks engaging in risky  exposures  (Raghavan,  
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2003).  The collapse of Lehman is a clear indication of this phenomenon. The failure could be attributed to a 
multiplicity of factors ranging from dubious accounting  practices,  unethical  management  practices,  over  
investment  in  risky  unsecured investments, laxity on the part of regulators (Morin & Maus, 2011). External 
auditors also played a major part in this failure by not detecting these financial statement malpractices by the 
Lehman managers. According to Greenfield (2010), the main indicators of fraud could be detected in the 
financial statement apparently; the external auditors could not discover this activity. It must however be noted 
that the demise of Lehman had not impacted on the US economy alone but the world  as  a  whole  hence;  firms  
ought  to  eschew  unnecessary  business  strategies,  stringent supervision  of  existing  regulations,  amended  of  
the  reporting  standards  to  prevent  dubious accounting practices, formulation of alternative and practical 
financial failure prediction models and regulations of the derivative market. The international business 
community must ensure that businesses hold high standards and ethical culture which to a large extent essential 
in avoiding collapse of firms in the global business world. 
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